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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XX APRIL, ig3 NUMBER 3
TORT CONTRIBUTION PRACTICE IN
NEW YORK
CHARLES O. GREGORY
(a) Reflections on Civil Practice Act Section 21i-a and Litigation
Thereunder
The New York legislature in section 21i-a of the Civil Practice
Act has created tort contribution only between tort-feasors against
whom the injured plaintiff has secured a joint money judgment.' This
statute requiring joint judgment liability as the necessary common
obligation is unfortunate, not only because it fails to conform to
customary notions of contribution generally, but also because it
makes contribution available only at the whim of the injured plaintiff.2
The common-law policy against contribution between tort-feasors
has been concerned only with denying the remedy to wrongdoers
altogether and not with changing the nature of the substantive law
of contribution.3 Hence when the reluctance to grant tort contribution
"'Action by one joint tort-feasor against another. Where a money judgment has
been recovered jointly against two or more defendants in an action for a personal
injury or for property damage, and such judgment has been paid in part or in full
by one or more of such defendants, each defendant who has paid more than his
own pro rata share shall be entitled to contribution from the other defendants with
respect to the excess so paid over and above the pro rata share of the defendant or
defendants making such payment; provided, however, that no defendant shall
be compelled to pay to any other such defendant an amount greater than his pro
rata share of the entire judgment. Such recovery may be had in a separate action;
or where the parties have appeared in the original action, a judgment may be en-
tered by one such defendant against the other by motion on notice."
2See Crouch, J., in Haines v. Bero E. C. Corp., 23o App. Div. 332, 335, 243
N. Y. Supp. 657, 661 (4th Dept. 193o), where he said: "It was not intended, we
think, that the opportunity of a defendant to utilize that right should depend
solely upon the will of a plaintiff;.. ." See also the REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1934, N. Y.) 268: ddThe result is that the very
substantial right of contribution is made to depend upon the whim of the plain-
tiff." See also Gregory, Procedural Aspects of Securing Tort Contribution in the In-
jured Plaintiffs Action (1933), 47 HARv. L. REV. 209, 228; (1928) 13 Cornell Law
Quarterly 640; (193I) 16 id. 246, 40o and 598.
3The nature of the common-law prejudice against tort contribution and of the
movement against it is ably set forth in the following accounts: Reath, Con-
tribution. between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan
(I898) 12 HARv. L. REv. 176; Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity between Tort-
feasors (1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. i3o; Notes (xgxx) 1i COL. L. REv. 665; (1931)
45 Hfiav. L. REv. 349.
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disappears there is every reason to believe it should be introduced,
if at all, on exactly the same basis as any other kind of contribution.
Although joint judgment liability is sufficient common obligation to
support contribution generally, it is not considered essential to the
recovery of contribution except in a few of the jurisdictions now per-
mitting tort contribution.4
The rules of contribution in general are exemplified in actions be-
tween cosureties. When a creditor executes a several judgment against
one of two cosureties, the latter may maintain a separate action
against his cosurety for contribution. The common obligation which
the claimant must show he has discharged for the benefit of himself
and his cosurety is their joint and several liability to the creditor
upon the principal's default. This is susceptible of proof in the claim-
ant's action and sufficiently establishes the necessary common obli-
gation without requiring the claimant to prove a joint judgment
against himself and his cosurety. Indeed the unfairness of such a re-
quirement is obvious, and a serious proposal to substitute it as the
common obligation necessary to contract contribution would be very
unpopular.
Now concerning the recovery of contribution, the common liability
of two joint tort-feasors to suffer joint and/or several judgments to
the injured party is exactly analogous to the common liability of two
cosureties to assume the defaulting principal's obligation jointly and/
or severally. In fact most jurisdictions in which tort contribution is
now available do not require joint judgment liability as the necessary
common obligation, but permit recovery of contribution to one of two
joint tort-feasors against whom a several judgment has been exe-
cuted5 In such an action the claimant for tort contribution is un-
able, it is true, to show any common liability as formal as that repre-
sented by the joint and several contract of cosureties. Nevertheless,
if he can show that his fellow tort-feasor was also negligent toward
the injured party under such circumstances that the latter might
have obtained a joint and/or several judgment against the tort-
feasors or either of them, the court recognizes a common liability
sufficient to support the claim for contribution.
4MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, Supp. 1929) art. 5o, § 12A; Mo. REV. STAT. (1929)
§ 3268; N. M. STAT. ANx. (Courtright, 1929) §§ 76-ioo; N. Y. C. P. A. (1920)
§ 21i-a; TEx. STAT. (Vernon, x928) art. 2212; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932)
§ 5482.
6Alist of the states which permit tort contribution either by decision of court or
under a statute may -be found in (1931) 45 HARv. L. REv. 349 and 369. See also
Oat. Stat., 2o Geo. v. c.27, _j3-093o); Kan. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1923) c. 6o, § 3437 as
interpreted in Ft. Scott v. Kansas City Ft. S. & M. R. Co., 66 Kan. 610, 72 Pac.
238 (19o).
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A glance at the litigation arising under section 21x-a shows that
requiring joint judgment liability as the necessary common obligation
places the control of contribution entirely in the injured plaintiff's
hands. Unless it is his pleasure to secure a final and executable joint
judgment, the burden of loss remains where the injured plaintiff
chooses to leave it. That contribution, a remedy obviously for the
benefit of defendants and of no interest whatsoever to the injured
plaintiff, should be left in this status is absurd.
The litigation under New York's tort contribution statute indicates
that the average joint tort-feasor, whether singly sued or appearing
as one of two codefendants jointly sued, is anxious to secure the bene-
fits of the statute by making certain that if he is held liable at all it
will be as a party to a joint judgment against himself and his fellow
joint tort-feasor. But the Court of Appeals has doomed to failure all
attempts of a tort-feasor to secure the statutory benefits except claims
against a fellow joint judgment debtor. A glance at a few of the out-
standing decisions will show the vital issues of this general problem
in sharp relief.
When the injured plaintiff sues both joint tort-feasors as code-
fendants the likelihood is that he will secure only a several judgment
against one of them with which he will be satisfied. In such an event
the luckless judgment debtor cannot secure contribution under the
statute. To avoid this the apprehensive claimant attempts to file a
cross-claim for contribution against his codefendant so that he may
help to prosecute the plaintiff's case against the latter and be in a
position to appeal from his codefendant's favorable judgment in case
the plaintiff, content with his several judgment against the claimant,
is unwilling to do so. In Price v. Ryan8 the Court of Appeals con-
demned such a cross-claim, declaring that the claimant had failed to
state a cause of action for tort contribution under the statute, and in-
sisting that his claim could be filed and litigated only when a joint
judgment had already been procured by the injured plaintiff against
both tort-feasors.
Taking the court at its word in a subsequent case where the in-
jured plaintiff had secured a joint judgment against two joint tort-
feasors, which was reversed as to one and affirmed as to the other by
the Appellate Division, the less fortunate codefendant appealed to the
Court of Appeals on his cross-claim for contribution from his code-
fendant's favorable judgment, asking for a reversal thereof or for a
new trial on the cross-claim in order to effect a joint judgment in
plaintiff's favor as a foundation for his claim for contribution under
6255 N. Y. I6, 173 N. E. 907 (1931).
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the statute. The Court of Appeals denied this appeal,7 asserting that
in spite of the joint judgment at the trial the claimant was still in no
position to litigate his claim since the' tort contribution statute also
stipulated that the claimant must not only be a party to a joint judg-
ment but must also have discharged more than his proportionate
share thereof before he states a cause of action. The court might have
added, of course, that the cross-claim on which the appeal was found-
ed had been filed before the joint judgment existed.
If these decisions are sound, as they undoubtedly are under the
statute, one of two or more codefendants jointly sued may never file
a litigable cross-claim for tort contribution under any circumstances.
The best reason for these decisions, not expressed by the court in
either of its opinions, seems to be the otherwise terrible inconvenience
to the plaintiff, since recognition of such a claim would entail keeping
his action open and delaying execution of his several judgment against
the claimant until he procures a final joint judgment which he does
not need and may not want. Furthermore, if a new trial were neces-
sary to effeci judgment liability against the defendant from whom
contribution is sought, the result could not be a joint judgment in
favor of the plaintiff but would be two probably inconsistent several
judgments, unless the plaintiff were forced to release his existing
several judgment against the claimant and to try both defendants
anew, an intolerable step which no court would sanction. In any
event since the claimant's object is to procure the joint judgment in
plaintiff's favor at all costs, and since he cannot do this unless the
plaintiff is compelled to delay execution of 'his several judgment
against the claimant until the latter has conducted an appeal and/or
a new trial, it is hardly conceivable that a court realizing such in-
convenience should ever permit a claim for tort contribution to be
filed in and as part of the injured plaintiff's action under a statute
such as New York's.8
Many cases arising under the New York statute involved the at-
tempt of a singly sued tort-feasor to add under section 193 (2) of the
Civil Practice Act his alleged fellow joint tort-feasor as a party de-
fendant to the injured plaintiff's action for the purpose of effecting
joint judgment liability and of thus establishing a basis for tort con-
tribution. In one of the most outstanding of these cases the Fourth
Department of the Appellate Division permitted a sued defendant'
to add an alleged joint tort-feasor for the purpose of securing con-
7Ward v. Iroquois Gas Corp., 258 N. Y. 214, 17o N. E. 317 (1932).
"This argument of convenience is set forth more thoroughly in Gregory, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 213-219.
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tribution.9 The court observed that such joinder is allowed to a singly
sued defendant without inconvenience to the original plaintiff for the
purpose of securing contract contribution, even though a separate
action is available therefor. Hence, it continued, it is all the more
reasonable to permit such joinder for the purpose of securing tort
contribution, for otherwise the claimant will never be able to secure
it at all, joint judgment liability being a statutory condition precedent
to such relief. Although the court pointed out that the immediate
objective of the joinder was a joint judgment in the plaintiff's favor
against both defendants, it apparently failed to appreciate that the
absence of any need for a joint judgment in securing contract con-
tribution and its necessity for tort contribution are the very factors
which make the existing practice for securing the former in the credi-
tor's action convenient and the attempted practice for securing the
latter in the injured plaintiff's action not only highly inconvenient
but impossible.
The Court of Appeals0 overruled this decision on the ground that
the third party statute, section i93 (2), specifically provides for the
joinder only when the claimant invoking it can show that if he is liable
the third party whom he seeks to add "is or will be liable... wholly or
in part" over to him. But, as the court points out, the claimant can-
not show this until a joint judgment exists in favor of the plaintiff
against himself and the third party, in accordance with the terms of
the tort contribution statute; and since it is primarily to bring about
this joint judgment that the claimant invokes the joinder statute in
the first instance, he is in the anomolous position of using this statute
to bring about the very condition precedent which he must show
exists before he is entitled to invoke it in the first place. Although
this argument is decisive, the considerations of convenience pre-
sented in a previous paragraph clinch the court's position.
The discussion so far emphasizes the limited application of the tort
contribution statute and should reveal how completely the benefits
of that statute lie within the exclusive control of the injured plaintiff.
It is probably apparent to the most casual reader that the only feature
of section 21x-a responsible for these defects in New York's system of
loss distribution is the requirement of joint judgment liability as the
common obligation necessary to securing contribution under the stat-
ute.
9Haines v. Bero E. C. Corp., 23o App. Div. 332,243 N. Y. Supp, 657 (4th Dept.
1930). Noted in (1931) I6 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 246; and see other notes on
§ 2iia, id. at 400, 598.
1 Fox v. Western N. Y. Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N. Y. 305, 178 N. E. 289 (I93I),
(1932) 17 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 693.
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(b) The Wisconsin Practice-A Comparison
Under its decision" creating contribution between negligent tort-
feasors and with the aid of an advanced system of procedure, the Wis-
consin court has developed an extremely efficient practice for -the re-
covery of tort contribution, which may serve as a model in juris-
dictions contemplating the development of a tort contribution prac-
tice. In that state a negligent tort-feasor may recover contribution
under a variety of circumstances, since joint judgment liability is
not the required common obligation on which the claim for con-
tribution must rest. Thus if the injured plaintiff recovers and executes
a several judgment against a singly sued joint tort-feasor, the de-
fendant may recover contribution in a separate action against his
fellow tort-feasor. In this separate action the claimant cannot prove
his defendant's liability to the injured plaintiff in the strict sense of
having to pay damages. But he does not have to prove a common
liability of this sort. He establishes a good claim for contribution by
merely proving that his defendant's negligence concurring with his
own brought about the harm to the injured plaintiff under circum-
stances which would have entitled such party to a joint and/or several
judgment against the claimant and his defendant, or either alone.
In his separate action the claimant tries his defendant, usually
with a jury and employing the same witnesses and evidence used
against himself by the original plaintiff, with the sole object of prov-
ing such defendant to have been with himself concurrently negligent
toward the original plaintiff. This is the only real issue involved since
the damages will be for that amount in excess of his share of the judg-
ment debt which the claimant discharged. The original injured plain-
tiff, of course, is not in the least interested in this separate action.
Presumably his judgment against the claimant and consequently his
claims against both tort-feasors have been completely satisfied.
In Wisconsin as elsewhere the claimant's best cause of action for
tort contribution is, of course, proof of his discharge of a joint judg-
ment in the original plaintiff's favor and against himself and his
fellow joint tort-feasor. Indeed the claimant may file a motion for
contribution in the original plaintiff's action after discharging more
than his share of the joint judgment and recover against his code-
fendant for such excess.12 But if he prefers to bring a separate action
he may do so, alleging and proving as his entire cause of action the
joint judgment and his discharge of more than his share. A separate
suit under such circumstances would of course be ill-advised. But
"Ellis v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., x67 Wis. 392, z67 N. W. 1o48 (19x8).
U2Haines v. Duffy, 206 Wis. 193,240 N. W. 152 (1931).
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it is noteworthy that in such a separate action the claimant does not
have to re-try his defendant's negligence to the plaintiff, the joint
judgment being accepted as proof of the common obligation. 3 On
the other hand, when the original plaintiff sues the tort-feasors jointly
and secures only a several judgment, the claimant paying this judg-
ment is not bound in his separate action by his fellow tort-feasor's
favorable judgment in the original action because, as the court says,
this latter judgment is not res judicata on the claimant. 4 In the sepa-
rate action based on the joint judgment, however, the court, while
admitting that such judgment is not res judicata between the parties
to the separate action, insists that no such question is involved but
simply treats the joint judgment as in fact the best possible evidence
of a common liability.
Wisconsin's tort contribution practice is most interesting, how-
ever, where this issue is raised in the injured plaintiff's action. This
may be done where the plaintiff has voluntarily joined both tort-
feasors as codefendants or where he has sued only one who adds the
other under an appropriate statute, the claimant in either case plead-
ing his demand by cross-claim. Naturally defendants against whom
such claims have been filed have contended that the claimant could
not state a cause of action for contribution in anticipation of the
existence, much less the discharge, of his own liability and that, even
if he could, no judgment could be rendered on such a claim in the
event of his success. But the Wisconsin court denied 5 these con-
tentions on the strength of a statute ' intended to facilitate the clean-
ing up in one action of incidental claims related to the same subject
matter or fact transaction giving rise to the original action. The perti-
nent section of this statute provides, in'brief, that "a defendant who
shows... that if he be held liable in the action he will have a right of
action against a third person not a party to the action for the amount
of the recovery against him, may.. apply to the court for an order
making such third person a party defendant in order that the rights
of all parties may be finally settled in one action." The court decided
that this section, obviously designed to facilitate the recovery of in-
demnity, was also intended to cover contribution, "since the whole
must include an amount less than the whole."' 7 Hence, it reasoned,
'
3Bakula v. Schwab, 167 Wis. 546, 168 N. W. 378 (1918); Wait v. Pierce, 19I
Wis. 2o2 and 225, 2io N. W. 410 and 822 (1926).
'
41bid. See also Grant v. Asmuth, I95 Wis. 458,218 N. W. 834 (1928); Michel v.
McKenna, 199 Wis. 6o8, 227 N. W. 396 (1929).15Wait v. Pierce, supra note r3.
16WIs. STAT. (1931) § 260. ig(3) and (4).
'
7Wait v. Pierce, supra note 13, at 230.
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the statute impliedly changed the substantive law concerning the
nature of a cause of action for contribution in all claims filed under
this statute, whether between codefendants or a singly sued de-
fendant and a third party. As for the judgment to be given to the
successful cross-claimant, the court implied authority from this same
statute to grant what it called a "contingent" judgment which would
be made final and executable on motion only after the claimant proves
his discharge of the original plaintiff's judgment against himself.'8
When the injured plaintiff voluntarily sues both tort-feasors as
codefendants in Wisconsin, they may file mutual cross-claims for
tort contribution which they may prosecute against each other at
the same time the plaintiff tries them, and all issues are submitted
to the jury at the same time since they are substantially identical,
requiring the same witnesses and evidence and relating to the same
objective: negligence vel non toward the original plaintiff. 19 The funda-
mental difference, however, between this practice as it exists in Wis-
consin and as it was attempted in New York lies in the nature of the
immediate objective of the cross-litigation. In the New York cases
we saw that this objective was a joint judgment in the injured plain-
tiff's favor. In Wisconsin, however, the claimant's objective is simply
to prove, whether the injured plaintiff does so or not, that his code-
fendant was negligent toward the plaintiff. He may on his pleadings
against the plaintiff strive to deny his own liability and at the same
time on his cross-pleadings seek to establish his codefendant's lia-
bility. When the codefendants file mutual cross-claims of this sort
each attempts to escape liability but to insure a recovery of con-
tribution if he fails to escape.
If the injured plaintiff recovers against one defendant, the other
receiving a favorable judgment, the former defendant, now the sole
claimant for contribution, may appeal from the adverse judgment
on the plaintiff's claim and from that on his own cross-claim. But
the object of the latter appeal is not to bring about a joint judgment.
If the claimant loses the first appeal but wins the second the plaintiff
executes his final judgment against him and withdraws from the
action satisfied, leaving the claimant to continue the action against
his codefendant, probably by new trial.20 The claimant's object in
this new trial is simply to prove his codefendant's negligence toward
the original plaintiff and thus to establish the common obligation
necessary to recover contribution.
'sWait v. Pierce, supra note x3, at 231-2.
19Wait v. Pierce, supra note 13, at 225 et seg.
0
-Scharmie v. Huebsch, 203 Wis. 261, 234 N. W. 358 (1931). This decision
marked the complete development of Wisconsin's tort.contribution practice.
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In passing it may be of interest to note the nature of the judgment
which the Wisconsin court invented to cover the situation in the
previous paragraph where the plaintiff withdrew from the action to
execute his several judgment against the claimant, leaving the latter
to continue the action. Although no such judgment had ever been
given at common law and the legislature had not expressly provided
for it, the court declared that the success of the practice under dis-
cussion depended upon employing it and hence inferred authority to
do so from the above-mentioned statute creating this practice. The
novelty of this invention which the court named the "split" judg-
ment lies in the possibility of rendering two entirely separate money
judgments at two different times in the same action at law.2 1
When the injured plaintiff sues only one of two joint tort-feasors,
the defendant may add the other as a third party defendant under the
statute already mentioned. The plaintiff may then amend to include
the third party as a codefendant in which case the action proceeds
exactly as if the plaintiff had sued them as codefendants originally.2
But if the plaintiff does not amend, the defendant alone can file a
cross-claim for contribution, such a step being unnecessary for the
third party since the plaintiff cannot take judgment against him.3
The sued defendant prosecutes the third party on his cross-claim
exactly as the plaintiff in turn prosecutes him, using the same wit-
nesses and testimony, the object of such cross-litigation being merely
to prove the third party's negligence toward the plaintiff. Both claims
are triedat the same time and all issues are submitted simultaneously
to the same jury. All rights of appeal which are available to any plain-
tiff or defendant exist also between the parties to the cross-litigation.
But such appeals, if any, need interfere in no way with the plaintiff's
action against the defendant. The plaintiff may withdraw and exe-
cute his several judgment as soon as he normally might do so, leav-
ing his defendant to continue the action, if necessary, against the
third party until final judgment is reached on the cross-claim for
contribution.2 4
This account of Wisconsin's tort contribution practice may seem
complicated, but the practice itself is not. It is simply the logical de-
velopment of the procedural ideal of litigating in one action all re-
lated claims arising out of the same fact transaction, and most of its
details are procedural incidents necessary to the achievement of this
211bid.
--Wait v. Pierce, supra note 13.23Mitchell v. Raymond, i81 Wis. 591, 195 N. W. 855 (1923); Wait v. Pierce,
supra note 13; Scharine v. Huebsch, supra note 20.24Scharine v. Huebsch, supra note 20.
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ideal. -New York fosters the same ideal with respect to other aspects
of substantive law such as contract contribution and indemnity of
any sort. The novelty of the Wisconsin practice lies only in its appli-
cation to tort contribution.
(c) The Future of Tort Contribution Practice in New York
The New York Commission on the Administration of Justice has
recently proposed to displace section 21 i-a of the Civil Practice Act
by a new and extremely comprehensive statute.25 The present writer
is naturally pleased that the Commission in this proposed legislation
substantially adopts his suggestions and model statute appearing in
a recent article.H This model statute, however, was intended to serve
as a point of departure for legislatures desiring a tort contribution
practice similar to that in Wisconsin but lacking the procedural facil-
ities of that state.27 Hence it is surprising that it or anything similar
to it should be thought appropriate in New York, a state in which
all the procedural developments necessary to such a practice are
available. Nevertheless the Commission's suggested statute is an
able statement of a tort contribution practice similar to that in Wis-
consin and merits a detailed consideration not only for appreciation
of its excellence but also to discover why the legislature failed to
adopt it.28
The Commission creates tort contribution in the first section of the
proposed statute. 9 Here it deals by mere implication with the most
fundamental aspect of the problem as it now exists in New York, by
omitting the stipulation in section 2i i-a of joint judgment liability
as the required common obligation necessary to the recovery of con-
tribution. A matter of this importance, however, deserves express
treatment and the Commission could settle it beyond doubt by in-
cluding a clause to the effect that the required common obligation
need not be joint judgment liability.
Furthermore in this section the Commission apparently proposes
to have contribution between willful as well as between negligent tort-
25REPORT OF THE COMISSION ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (N. Y.,
1934) 265 et seq.
26Gregory, op. cit. supra note 2, at 243, n. 122.
2Thus the writer's model statute is to be introduced as a bill before the present
session of the Massachusetts legislature.
28The Commission's proposed statute passed the New York Senate but died
in the Rules Committee of the Assembly.
21'There shall be a right of contribution between or among joint tort-feasors,
in all cases where two or more-persons are responsible for a tort, whether the tort
was the result of concerted or unconcerted action by the tort-feasors, and whethe,
such action was successive or concurrent in time."
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feasors. No other jurisdiction has so completely abandoned the com-
mon-law prejudice against tort contribution; 30 but this feature could
hardly have deterred the legislature from adooting the statute since
section 2i-a is similar in this respect.
The second section3' of the proposed statute would permit the
cross-litigation of the issue of contribution between codefendants in
the injured plaintiff's own action; and if all of the alleged joint tort-
feasors were not joined at such plaintiff's instance, those sued might
add any such others as third parties for the purpose of cross-claiming
against them. 2 Against such third party defendants the injured plain-
30See Leflar, op. cit. supra note 3, at 139 and 145. on the latter page he suggests
legislation which he apparently believes would permit contribution between all
joint tort-feasors, regardless of the nature of their liability, as to which see his foot-
note 66 on p. 145.
*
1
"Contribution between tort-feasors may be enforced by counterclaim or cross
complaint in an action brought by the injured person. If any-person alleged to be
liable jointly for the tort is not made a party to the action he may in the discretion
of the Court be joined ds a party defendant upon the application of any defendant.
"The plaintiff may thereupon serve an amended complaint against all the de-
fendants, or the plaintiff may proceed without amendment, in which event the
plaintiff shall be permitted to recover judgment against the person so joined, as
if the appropriate allegations in the original defendant's pleading against such
person were included in the complaint.
"Such tort-feasors claiming contribution against each other shall be treated as
adverse parties in the action with the right to appeal against each other, and all
other procedural rights allowed by law to adverse parties in actions except that
no controversy between the tort-feasors subsequent to the rendition of the verdict
or decision shall be permitted to delay the entry of judgment to which the injured
person is entitled or the enforcement of the same, unless the court otherwise
directs.
"Where two or more joint tort-feasors are parties defendant to an action
brought by the person injured, a motion for nonsuit as to any defendant against
whom contribution is claimed, shall not be granted, except with the consent of
all the defendants, until the completion of the whole case. The defendants shall
be called upon to offer evidence in the order in which they are named in the com-
plaint or in the order in which they are subsequently joined as parties defendant,
unless otherwise directed by the court.
"In the event that an action against joint tort-feasors terminates in a judg-
ment against two or more defendants who claimed contribution from each other,
any defendant who has paid more than his pro rata share of the judgment shall
be entitled to recover the proper share of the excess from the other defendant or
defendants by separate action or by motion in the original action."
uThe third section of the Commission's proposed statute would permit the
recovery of tort contribution by separate action. This section reads as follows:
"In the event that only one or less than all of the joint tort-feasors are joined in
the original action or if for any other reason the claim to contribution is not ad-
judicated in said action any tort-feasor who has paid more than his pro rata share
of the damages for the tort may enforce his claim for contribution from the other
joint tort-feasors in a separate action therefor."
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tiff would have the option of amending his complaint and prosecuting
them as codefendants although he might take judgment against them
without so amending if they were found "liable" to him on the cross-
claim filed by any of the originally sued defendants. This latter
feature" would no doubt be desirable as a kind of exonatory remedy
if the injured plaintiff would take the trouble to execute equally
against all of the defendants; but it is probably objectionable as part
of the proposed statute since it is a feature not already available in
similar types of litigation involving cross-claims for contract con-
tribution.
The third paragraph of the second proposed section would make
the defendants claiming contribution against each other adverse
parties for the purpose of appealing from judgments on cross-claims
against each other and would secure to them "all other procedural
rights allowed by law to adverse parties in actions," expressly stipu-
lating, however, that no controversy between the tort-feasors shall
delay the entry and enforcement of any judgment to which the in-
jured plaintiff might have been entitled, unless the court otherwise
directs. The provisions of this paragraph, of course, are sound but
are already covered, either expressly or by implication, in sections
193 (2) and 264 of the Civil Practice Act as will be shown below.
The next paragraph of this section would protect the defendant
tort-feasors from having their claims against other codefendants or
third party defendants weakened by the injured plaintiff's dismissing
his action against such latter parties. This feature is hardly neces-
sary, however, since sections 193 (2) and 264 of the Civil Practice
Act provide by implication that a cross-claimant for contribution
would have as much right as the original plaintiff to prosecute the
defendant against whom he claims. The final provisions in this section
dealing with the order of the defendants' testimony and permitting a
claimant for contribution to secure final judgment on motion against
a fellow joint judgment debtor are no doubt commendable but do
not seem vitally essential.
The fourth section 4 of the proposed statute which deals with the
manner of apportioning contribution seems entirely unnecessary
nThis feature is most unusual and has appeared only in PA. STAT. ANN. (Pur-
don, 193) tit. 12, § 141 , as amended by Pa. Acts (193') No. 236, p. 663. It is dis-
cussed in Gregory, op. cit. supra note 2, at 230.
34"In determining the amount of the share of each defendant for the purpose of
contribution, the damages for which all of the joint tort-feasors are responsible
shall be divided by the number of tort-feasors, provided, however, that if one or
more of the tort-feasors did not participate personally in the commission of the
tort, but is liable for the tort only by reason of his legal relation to one or more
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since it merely approximates a statement of the rules ordinarily
idverning apportionment of responsibility for contribution generally.
Inasmuch as these provisions resemble the common law their adoption
by statute is unnecessary, and inasmuch as they differ from the com-
mon law, if at all, their adoption would introduce an unfortunate
distinction between tort and contract contribution.
The fifth section35 of the proposed statute seems at first glance
merely unnecessary; but reflection shows that its adoption would be
extremely unwise. In the first place it would crystallize an established
common-law rule which, if left to the courts, may be gradually abol-
ished. For example, if one of two negligent persons is the plaintiff's
spouse or parent the plaintiff may not take judgment in tort against
him in New York. 6 From a decision of a lower court under section
21i-a it is clear that the other negligent person may therefore not
secure contribution from such relative of the plaintiff, 37 a result which
seems quite unfortunate although it is inevitable under the presently
accepted notions of contribution requiring a common obligation or
liability to the injured plaintiff. But this section would also deny
the claim for contribution by one tort-feasor against another when the
plaintiff had covenanted not to sue the latter, a result contrary to
decisions involving this point and in effect permitting the injured
of the other tort-feasors, the persons bearing such relation to each other shall for
the purposes of contribution be considered as a single tort-feasor.
"If any of the persons liable for contribution is insolvent and if his share is not
recoverable from any insurance carrier or other person, or if any of the persons
liable for contribution is out of the jurisdiction at the time when the right of con-
tribution is sought to be enforced and cannot be reached by the process of the
courts of this state, he shall be excluded in the computation of the amount to be
contributed by each of the other tort-feasors, but the tort-feasors who pay the
damage for the tort shall be entitled to enforce their claim for contribution from
the said person in any insolvency proceedings, or in a subsequent action or in
separate actions brought by each of the persons making such payment for their
proper portion of the share which the other tort-feasor should have paid.
"No tort-feasor shall be required to pay by way of contribution to any other
tort-feasor more than his pro rata share as determined in accordance with this
Statute, but the right of the person injured by the tort to recover the whole
amount of his claim from any one of the persons liable therefor shall not in any
way be affected or impaired by this Statute."3
"There shall be no right of contribution against a person responsible in part
for the commission of a tort if by reason of the relationship between the said per-
son and the person injured by the tort, or if for any other reason, no action at law
would be maintainable by the latter against him."
6For example, see Ackerson v. Kibler, 138 Misc. 695, 246 N. Y. Supp. 58o
(i93i).
371bid. This is well-settled elsewhere. For a discussion with citation of cases
see Gregory, op. e. supra note 2, at 241-242,
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plaintiff to dispose of a right created by the legislature for each de-
fendant tort-feasor's benefit.38 This second objection could be elimi-
nated by striking from the proposed section the words "... .or if for
any other reason. . ."; but the section would still seem inadvisable.
The next section 9 is, of course, quite unnecessary, since it is un-
likely that any court will permit the contribution statute to interfere
with any defendant's right to recover indemnity under a statute or
at common law.
The following section of the proposed statute dealing with the
release by the injured plaintiff of any one of the tort-feasors respon-
sible for his injury may be desirable.4 0 It seems to change the common
law governing the incidents of a release granted by an injured person
to one of several joint tort-feasors; but as long as this change in no
way interferes with the benefits guaranteed to the other tort-feasors
by the contribution statute it seems unobjectionable. It certainly
does not add to the rights of any of the tort-feasors, except perhaps
to those of the party released, since at common law all would be auto-
matically released by implication. Even the party released would
probably be in no better position for it seems likely that the mere
creation of contribution between tort-feasors would entitle him to
contribution to the amount he expended in discharging the entire
38La Lone v. Carlin, 139 Misc. 553, 247 N. Y. 665 (193z).
3 9
"This statute shall not impair the right of any tort-feasor to recover-indem-
nity from another under the existing rules of law."
40
"A release given by an injured person to one of several joint tort-feasors shall
relieve the person released from any liability for contribution on account of the
claim or cause of action released.
"The effect of such a release with respect to the liability of the other tort-feas-
ors shall be as follows:
"If the release contains an express statement that the consideration paid there-
for is intended to constitute full satisfaction of the claim of the injured person,
the injured person shall have no further claim against the other joint tort-feasors.
However, in such case the tort-feasor obtaining the release shall be entitled to en-
force contribution from the other tort-feasors to the extent to which he shall have
paid more than his pro rata share of the damages for which the joint tort-feasors
were responsible, but in the absence of such a statement the tort-feasor making
the voluntary payment and obtaining the release shall not be entitled to enforce
contribution.
"If the release does not contain the said statement, the injured person shall be
entitled to enforce his claim against the other tort-feasors, but his claim against
them shall be reduced by the amount which they would have been entitled to
obtain from the person released by way of contribution if the release had not
been given, or by the amount actually paid to the injured person in consideration
for the said release, whichever amount is the greater."
As to this proposed section see La Lone v. Carlin, supra note 38; and Blauvelt
v. Village of Nyack, 141 Misc. 730.252 N. Y. Supp. 746 (1931).
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obligation. The matter covered in this section, however, really has
little to do with tort contribution as such and would seem more ap-
propriate in a statute dealing with joint and several obligations gen-
erally-
The last section41 of the proposed act seems unnecessary since the
courts will hardly be misled by the substitution, after the injured
person's decease, of his next of kin or personal representatives. And
that part of this section dealing with the type of injuries with respect
to which contribution will be granted might better appear in the first
section as definitional of the rights of contribution created.
In this wholesale criticism of the proposed statute the writer is not
trying to belittle the Commission's efforts but is attempting to dis-
cover why the legislature refused to adopt their proposals. Perhaps
the legislature felt that the proposed act was too long and included
too much unnecessary detail. Certainly it would be justified in re-
fusing to adopt the Commission's suggested statute, even though it
otherwise approved this type of practice, in view of existing pro-
cedural devices on which a practice of this sort might be estab-
lished.
Wisconsin's flawless practice is composed of a common-law declar-
ation of cdntribution between tort-feasors,4 a statute permitting
cross-litigation between defendants,41 and a third party joinder stat-
ute,44 welded together by a court determined to achieve the pro-
cedural ideal expressed in these two statutes of cleaning up as far as
possible in one action all related claims arising out of the same subject
matter or fact transaction. Since the New York legislature entertains
this same procedural ideal and has provided more complete and de-
tailed rules of procedure and practice with which to realize it, 4 a
simple statute creating tort contribution without the requirement of
joint judgment liability as the necessary common obligation is alone
sufficient to institute a practice similar to that in Wisconsin.
Thus section 264 of the Civil Practice Act parallels the Wisconsin
41
"The phrase 'injured person' and the phrase 'person injured by the tort' shall
include any person who suffers a personal injury or any injury to any tangible or
intangible property or any interest therein, by reason of the commission of any
tort, and shall also include the personal representatives of such persons and shall
also include any person who may be entitled to recover damages from the tort-
feasors by reason of the commission of a tort affecting the person or property, or
causing the death, of another."
4EIlis v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., supra note Ii.
43WIS. STAT. (1931) § 263. iS(i) and (2).
"
4WIs. STAT. (1931) § 260. x9(3) and (4).45N. Y. C. P. A. (1920) §§ 193(2) and (4) and 264.
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statute permitting cross-litigation between defendants, 46 and section
x93 (2) of the Civil Practice Act is broader than the Wisconsin third
party statute.47 Indeed the latter New York statute alone is sufficient
" 'Ws. STAT. (193) § 263. 15. "Cross Complaint. (i) A defendant or a person
interpleaded or intervening may have affirmative relief against a codefendant, or
a codefendant and the plaintiff, or part of the plaintiffs, or a codefendant and a
person not a party, or against such person alone, upon his being brought in; but
in all such cases such relief must involve or in some manner affect the contract,
transaction or property which is the subject matter of the action. Such relief may
be demanded in the answer, which must be served upon the party against whom
the same is asked or upon such person not a party, upon his being brought in, or
may be by a cross complaint served in like manner or by petition in intervention
under section 26o.i9, or by answer, served in like manner, when new parties are
brought in under sections 26o.i9 and 260.20.
"(2) In all cases the court or the judge thereof may make such orders for the ser-
vice of the pleadings, the bringing in of new parties, the proceedings in the cause,
the trial of the issues and the determination of the rights of the parties as shall be
just. The party against whom such relief is demanded may demur to the answer
or cross complaint, as provided in section 263.17, or may answer, serving such
demurrer or answer on the defendant claiming such relief, as well as upon the
plaintiff, or he may object thereto at the trial for insufficiency. If he shall serve no
answer or demurrer and make no such objection he shall be deemed to have
denied the allegations relied on for such relief. Unless such an answer, petition or
cross complaint be so served such affirmative relief shall not be adjudged."
N. Y. C. P. A. (1920) § 264. "Controversy between defendants. Where the
judgment may determine the ultimate rights of two or more defendants as be-
tween themselves, a defendant who requires such a determination must demand
it in his answer, and at least twenty days before the trial must serve a copy of his
answer upon the attorney for each of the defendants to be affected by the de-
termination, and personally, or as the court or judge may direct, upon defendants
so to be affected who have not duly appeared therein by attorney. The contro-
versy between the defendants shall not delay a judgment to which the plaintiff
is entitled, unless the court otherwise directs."
47 Wss. STAT. (1931) § 260.i9. "(3) A defendant who shows'by affidavit that if
he be held liable in the action he will have a right of action against a third person
not a party to the action for the amount of the recovery against him, may, upon
due notice to such person and to the opposing party, apply to the court for an
order making such third person a party defendant in order that the rights of all
parties may be finally settled in one action, and the court may in its discretion
make such order.
"(4) This section shall be liberally construed in order that, so far as practicable,
all closely related contentions may be disposed of in one action, even though in
the strict sense there be two controversies, provided the contentions relate to the
same general subject and separate actions" would subject either of the parties to
the danger of double liability or serious hardship."
N. Y. C. P. A. (1920) § x93. "(2) Where any party to an action shows that some
third person, not then a party to the action, is or will be liable to such party wholly
or in part for the claim made against such party in the action, the court, on appli-
cation of such party, may order such person to be brought in as a party to the
action and direct that a supplemental summons and a pleading alleging the claim
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to support a tort contribution practice similar to that in Wisconsin,
whether the cross-litigation arose between a sued defendant and an
added third party or between originally sued codefendants. For if a
court would permit such litigation between a defendant and an added
third party it would naturally have to permit it between jointly sued
codefendants as well. Moreover since sections 264 and 193 (2) of the
Civil Practice Act already sanction this practice for the cross-liti-
gation of claims for contract contribution 8 they would automatically
sanction it for the recovery of tort contribution after it is by statute
placed on a par with contract contribution.
These two sections of the Civil Practice Act impliedly constitute
the parties to cross-litigation of this sort adverse parties for the pur-
pose of prosecution and appeals and impliedly authorize the courts
to permit the injured plaintiff to withdraw from the action at any
time and execute any judgment he may have received against any of
the parties defendant, leaving the defendants to continue the action
for the purpose of litigating contribution issues of interest to them-
selves alone. These two sections expressly provide for the type of
judgments necessary to achieve the practice in question, that is,
what the Wisconsin court terms the "contingent" and "split" judg-
ments.49 ,
But if express provision for the type of judgments necessary in
such cross-litigation in the injured plaintiff's action were not avail-
able, the New York courts could as surely be trusted to infer author-
ity for them from the general provisions of section 264 and 193 (2)
of the Civil Practice Act as the Wisconsin court did from its corre-
sponding procedural statutes. After all these New York sections can-
not function unless the court can grant the contingent judgment on
the cross-claim for contribution, since a final money judgment can-
not be entered on such a cross-claim until the injured plaintiff has
executed his judgment. Nor can the practice called for in these sec-
tions be achieved without the split judgment, since such practice
would be futile unless the injured plaintiff could withdraw and exe-
cute whatever judgment he may have recovered, leaving the cross-
of such party against such person be served upon such person and that such person
plead thereto, so that the claim of such moving party against such person may be
determined in such action, which shall thereupon proceed against such person as
a defendant therein to such judgment as may be proper.
"(4) The controversy between the defendants shall not delay a judgment to
which the plaintiff is entitled, unless the court otherwise directs."
48See Crouch, J., in Haines v. Bero E. C. Corp., supra note I, at 334.
41See N. Y. C. P. A. (1920) § 193(2) and (4), clauses referring to type of judg-
ment, and see concluding clause of § 264. See note (1932) 17 CORNELL LAW QUART-
ERLY 693.
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litigants to continue a controversy in which he is no longer inter-
ested.
But the Commission's proposed statute seems unwise for other
reasons. It seems tactically inept since it resurrects before the legis-
lature procedural issues which have already received a satisfactory
disposition and for which the present personnel of the legislature
might not wish to be thought responsible. Moreover, the proposed
statute seems to betray distrust on the Commission's part that the
courts will develop the desired practice from the available sections
of the Civil Practice Act. It seems much wiser to leave this develop-
ment to the courts and to minimize the possibilities of confusion
through judicial interpretation presented by the introduction of more
detailed procedural rules in a state that already has plenty with
which to contend. After all, the New York courts are committed to
an interpretation of the present procedural statutes which is favor-
able to the practice under discussion.5
The writer's thesis is, in short, that if tort contribution is put
on the same basis as contract contribution in New York, litigation
of the issue of tort contribution in the injured plaintiff's action will
'
0Although there seems to be no square decision in which § 193 (2) of the C. P.
A. was employed in securing contract contribution, it has been employed for re-
covery of indemnity, and the Appellate Courts of New York have clearly stated
that its purpose was also to enable the recovery of contribution in the original
plaintiff's action. Municipal S. R. E. Co., Inc. v. D. B. & M. Holding Corp., 257
N. Y. 423, 178 N. E. 745 (1931); Foxy. Western N. Y. M. L. Inc., 257 N. Y. 305,
178 N. E. 289 (i93); Stern v. Ide & Co., Inc., 212 App. Div. 714, 2o9 N. Y.
Supp. 473 (ist Dept. 1925); Haines v. Bero E. C. Corp., 230 App. Div. 332 at
334,243 N. Y. Supp. 657 (4th Dept. I93O); Merrett v. Rhodes, 232 App. Div. 422,
252 N. Y. Supp. 114 (2d Dept. 193).
Indeed the fact that most of the judges on the Appellate Division regarded its
use to enable the recovery of tort contribution as not only proper but essential
indicates the procedural purpose of this section. See Crouch, J. in Haines v. Bero
B. C. Corp., supra; and see Davis v. Hauk & Schmidt Inc., 232 App. Div. 556, 250
N. Y. Supp. 537 (ist Dept. 193r). Other cases are cited in annotated editions of
the Civil Practice Act. In fact the Court of Appeals recognized this but felt that
because of the wording of the tort contribution statute which put the substantive
right of recovering tort contribution on such a different basis from the recovery
of contract contribution, the use of § 193 (2) as a means of recovering tort con-
tribution was improper. But the court fairly implied that it took this stand only
because of the unusual requirement in the tort contribution statute of joint judg-
ment liability as a condition precedent to recovery of the particular kind of con-
tribution in question. Price v. Ryan, 255 N. Y. z6, 173 N. E. 907 (1930); Fox v.
Western N. Y. L. M. Inc., supra.
§ 264 of the C. P. A. authorizing cross-litigation between defendants is prob-
ably unnecessary to this practice. There is apparently no case decided thereunder
involving the recovery of contribution, but a glance at this section and the sparse
annotations thereunder will indicate its applicability to the practice in question.
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inevitably follow. Hence he suggests as an adequate substitute for
section 211-a of the Civil Practice Act a very brief statute creating
tort contribution without the required common obligation of joint
judgment liability and including whatever additional measures the
Commission deems absolutely necessary. As a mere suggestion of
what the writer has in mind he deferentially proposes the following
paragraph, not claiming it to be better than the Commission's pro-
posed statute, but merely believing it to be more the sort of statute
the legislature is likely to enact:
Tort contribution shall be allowed between tort-feasors causing
damage to the person or property of another through such joint,
concurrent or successive inadvertence or negligence as would
render all of such tort-feasors commonly liable to suffer a joint
and/ or several adverse judgment for the entire damage at the
injured plaintiff's option. The common obligation or liability
necessary to maintain an action or claim for tort contribution
need not be joint judgment liability.
